04/03/2016 by socialistfight
Marcel Liebman. His works can be found here: https://www.marxists.org/archive/liebman/index.htm
Socialist Fight note: I have scanned in this very important chapter from Marcel Liebman’s excellent book, Leninism under Lenin because it deals in detail with Lenin’s last struggle and it comprehensively debunks the Stalin was the continuation of Lenin myth. It shows that Lenin fought to his last political breath the rise of this bureaucratic counter-revolutionary monstrosity that is known as Stalinism. In many ways it is a precis of Moshe Lewin’s great book, Le Dernier Combat de Lénine (Paris, 1967 English translation, Lenin’s Last Struggle, London, 1969). Liebman says below: “In a ﬁnal note, dated December 31st, like the previous one, Lenin called for punishment of the Soviet leaders guilty of indulging in a chauvinist and oppressive policy towards the Georgians. Although ‘exemplary punishment must be inﬂicted on Comrade Ordzhonikidze’, he considered that ‘the political responsibility for all this truly Great Russian nationalist campaign must, of course, be laid on Stalin and Dzerzhinsky.”
Footnotes in this chapter have been added to the endnotes and the I have included the text referred to in note 25 below, the only one of them that is outside the extract in the main body of the book at page 276.
3 March 2016
Epilogue: The End of Lenin
Although paying some attention to Lenin’s individual characteristics, this book has hitherto avoided a biographical treatment of its subject. In this concluding part, however, the biographical method will take over, for reasons arising from the author’s very purpose, namely, to distinguish what Leninism was really about. This stands forth in tragic relief in the last months of Lenin’s life, which offer the political historian a source of highly signﬁcant observations.
There is an air of tragedy about those last months which some writer or playwright ought surely by now to have sensed and given artistic form worthy of the greatness of the subject. Lenin’s career was a victorious one, of course, and tragedy ﬁnds its material in defeats rather than in victories. But Lenin’s career has seemed completely victorious only because of the silence that for so long surrounded the last months of his life. It is necessary to penetrate beyond appearances, however—the familiar appearances of the founder of Soviet Russia, the victor of October and the civil war, the successful revolutionary and builder of a new order. This picture has political implications.
The idea of ‘Lenin triumphant’ provides support not only for Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy but also for the views of bourgeois historiography, always disposed to see in Leninism merely a ‘will to power’—Lenin, having once conquered and consolidated his conquest, is supposed to have gone to his rest in an atmosphere of glory and self-satisfaction. That is the legend. Here are the facts.
In May 25th, 1922, Lenin suffered his ﬁrst crisis of arteriosclerosis: his right hand and leg became paralysed and his speech impaired. After a long convalescence, he returned to work in the ﬁrst days of October 1922. On December 13th another attack forced Lenin to retire definitively. On March 10th, 1923, after an attack that occurred three days earlier, he ﬁnally lost the power of speech. He died on January 22nd, 1924. Behind these dates and details of Lenin’s health, however, lies ‘Lenin’s last struggle’, which was a struggle not only against illness but also, and above all, for Leninism and socialism. And never did Lenin the ﬁghter have to ﬁght harder or in more painful circumstances.
He was kept in conditions almost amounting to seclusion.
After the attack suffered on December 13th, 1922, forced him to suspend a political activity which had already been slowed down, no one was allowed to visit him, by order of the Central Committee, or rather by Stalin himself, who had been entrusted with supervision of the sick leader. ‘Friends and servants are forbidden to communicate anything to Lenin concerning political life, in order not to give him cause for reflection and anxiety.”  As Moshe Lewin writes, ‘thus began Lenin’s exhausting struggle to be kept informed of what interested him, to formulate his opinions and to communicate them to the right people’? 
He had asked for permission to dictate to his secretaries for a few minutes every day. The doctors, who worked in concert with the Political Bureau, refused this permission. Lenin retorted by threatening that, in that case, he would refuse to co-operate in any further treatment. The doctors yielded, but the Political Bureau in other words, Stalin speciﬁed that, although Lenin was to be allowed to dictate ‘for ﬁve to ten minutes a day’, what he wrote ‘ought not to have the character of a correspondence and [Lenin] must not expect replies to those notes’?  It was under these conditions, laid down on December 24th, 1922, that Lenin dictated the few pages that are known as his ‘Testament’.
Lenin’s secretaries, and Krupskaya herself, were literally spied upon by the Party’s General Secretary and his collaborators, and this led to an incident occurring between Stalin and Lenin’s wife that will be referred to later. As one of the secretaries notes, under the date February 12th, 1923, in the joint diary that they kept during Lenin’s illness, ‘The fact that the doctors knew about this [the fact that their patient was ‘interested in the census of Soviet employees’, M.L.] upset Vladimir Ilyich. Apparently, furthermore, Vladimir Ilyich had the impression that it was not the doctors who gave instructions to the Central Committee, but the Central Committee that gave instruction to the doctors.  Stalin had already asked the secretary, on January 30th, whether she had been telling Lenin ‘things he was not to be told – how was it he was posted about current affairs? 
The ‘current affairs’ in question concerned, inter alia, the development of the situation in Georgia, where the Georgian Communists desire for independence had clashed with the harsh centralizing policy of Stalin and his lieutenant Ordzhonikidze.  In order to obtain the information on this matter that was being concealed from him. Lenin organized what he himself called a ‘“secret” job’ for his secretaries.  Having asked the Political Bureau to send him a number of files, he found himself up against a persistent refusal to cooperate. On January 30th, 1923, one of the secretaries wrote in the service diary: ‘Today Vladimir Ilyich sent for me to learn the answer [to his request for the ﬁles, M.L.] and said that he would fight to get the materials. 
He did indeed ﬁght, wresting information from those in control of him, and preparing, bit by bit, an immense document which he intended for the Party congress which was soon to take place. When Lenin’s secretary Fotieva gave Lenin some information she had to do this ‘as if “by clumsiness.” ’ And when, by a miracle of effort, Lenin managed to dictate some articles and notes he had to fight again to get the Party leadership to publish the material that he sent to Pravda. In the Political Bureau they even discussed having a single copy of Pravda printed for Lenin’s beneﬁt, containing an article he wanted published but which they would have preferred not to make known to the general public. 
This was an article sharply criticising Rabkrin, the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection, which was headed by Stalin himself, between March 1919 and April 1922. Cut off in this way from the outside world, isolated and spied upon, it was against Stalin that Lenin was waging the most furious, most desperate but also most signiﬁcant of all his struggles. What was at stake was nothing less than whether or not he would succeed in changing the course being followed by the Soviet state in a number vital areas: bureaucratic degeneration, the excessive power wielded by the future dictator, and tendencies towards oppression of the national minorities.
An apparently mild problem had given rise to the ﬁrst skirmishes between Lenin and Stalin. As a result of the N.E.P., some Soviet economic leaders considered it necessary to relax the state monopoly of foreign trade, but Lenin had opposed the decisions taken on this matter by the Central Committee in October 1922. For Lenin the monopoly of foreign trade was essential in order to raise around Soviet Russia a barrier behind which she might build an economy centred upon large-scale industry and a strong proletariat.“ Stalin, however, thought that ‘a weakening [i.e., of the monopoly of foreign trade, M.L.] is becoming inevitable’. 
Lenin formed an alliance on this question with Trotsky, who shared his views, and charged him with defending their common position. They succeeded in getting the decisions taken by the Central Committee reviewed and a complete re-examination of the problem undertaken. Lenin wrote to Trotsky: ‘I consider that we have quite reached agreement. I ask you to declare our solidarity at the plenum.  This joint offensive by Lenin and Trotsky was crowned with success, the measures aimed against the foreign trade monopoly being withdrawn in December 1922. Soon afterwards Lenin said, in another letter addressed to Trotsky: ‘It looks as though it has been possible to take the position without a single shot, by a simple manoeuvre. I suggest that we should not stop and should continue the offensive’. 
Problems of even greater importance did call for vigorous intervention. There was, ﬁrst of all, the question of the machinery of state, the enormous faults in which Lenin had now come to appreciate fully. The struggle against bureaucracy had been entrusted to the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection, which was headed by Stalin until he became General Secretary. In the last article he wrote, ‘Better Fewer, But Better,’ Lenin declared: ‘The People’s Commissariat of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection does not at present enjoy the slightest authority. Everybody knows that no other institutions are worse organized than those of our Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection.’ 
On January 23rd, 1923, Lenin dictated to his secretaries a note entitled: ‘How we should reorganize the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection’, intended for the Twelfth Party Congress. In it he proposed that this enormous body of over ten thousand officials be reduced to a small group of three or four hundred.  He further indicated that these survivors of Rabkrin should lose their independence, becoming merely ‘auxiliaries’ of the Central Control Commission, which he wanted to see enlarged by the inclusion of a few dozen new members chosen among Communists of worker or peasant origin?  This decision, had it been carried out, would have meant the disappearance of one of those institutions upon which Stalin’s growing power was founded. Lenin was thus again in conﬂict with the General Secretary, and in order to wage this struggle, he drew still closer to Trotsky. 
Liebman’s famous book in its original French
In his autobiography, Trotsky mentions a talk he had with Lenin in October 1922. Lenin said: ‘Our bureaucratism is something monstrous. I was appalled when I came back to work.’ And he proposed that he and Trotsky ‘form a bloc’ to ﬁght against this menace, attacking its manifestations in both Party and state.  On one point at least, Lenin now came round to some ideas of Trotsky’s that he had formerly rejected: he recognized the need to increase the powers of Gosplan, the organization responsible for economic planning, and in particular to endow it with wide legislative functions. 
More generally, Lenin acknowledged the correctness of the views expressed by Trotsky when he sought, within the framework of the N.E.P., and despite ill interpretation given to the latter by some other Soviet leaders. In preserve and increase the possibilities for planning and industrialisation. In a letter dictated on November 25th, 1922, Lenin recommended publication as a pamphlet of the ideas that Trotsky had worked out on this theme.  But since the antagonism between Trotsky and Stalin was already acute, threatening, as Lenin said in his ‘Testament’ to bring about a split in the Party,  the bloc formed against bureaucracy and for an economic policy more sensitive to the need for planning and industrialization, by bringing Lenin closer to Trotsky, widened still further the gulf between Lenin and Stalin.
During the last weeks of his active life, Lenin’s struggle became even sharper. The clash with Stalin assumed a more direct form, Lenin’s feelings of alarm grew more precise and intense, and he threw his last reserves of strength into a battle to save the Soviet achievement from the ravages of, ‘Great-Power chauvinism’.
On December 30th, 1922, Lenin dictated to his secretaries a note on ‘The Question of Nationalities, or of “Autonomisation”.’ It opened: ‘I suppose I have been very remiss with respect to the Workers of Russia for not having intervened energetically and decisively enough in the notorious question of Autonomisation.  How had Lenin come to make such a confession, which was something unusual for him, and to express so strong a sense of culpability? What lay behind this development was the evolution of relations between the central Soviet Government and the republics that the non-Great-Russian national minorities had organized within the Soviet state. Before 1922 these relations had been governed by bilateral treaties linking Russia separately with Byelorussia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and giving these republics a semblance of independence. 
In 1922 these arrangements were being changed. Despite opposition from the Georgian Communists, it was proposed to create a ‘Transcaucasian Federation’, grouping together Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. A commission headed by Stalin was engaged in working out a new constitution. According to the draft that this commission produced, the republics were to be integrated into a Russian Federation, the government of which would be that of the Russian Republic itself. Four out of the ﬁve non-Great-Russian republics opposed this plan, but their views were ignored. Lenin, who was following the matter without intervening directly, now warned the Political Bureau: ‘In my opinion the matter is of utmost importance. Stalin tends to be somewhat hasty. 
He put forward his own plan, in opposition to Stalin’s. To integration of the other republics in a Russian Federal Republic he opposed the idea of uniting all the republics, Russia included, in ‘a Union of Soviet Republics Europe and Asia’.  Realizing the threat to the non-Great-Russian nationalities that was inherent in Stalin’s intentions, Lenin launched a full-scale attack against the policy being pursued by the General Secretary. In a letter addressed to the Political Bureau he made no secret of his readiness to ﬁght: ‘I declare war to the death on dominant-nation chauvinism. I shall eat it with all my healthy teeth as soon as I get rid of this accursed bad tooth. It must be absolutely insisted that the Union Central Executive Committee should be presided over in turn by a Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian, etc. 
Stalin did not ﬂinch, however. When, during a meeting of the Political Bureau, Kamenev passed him a note mentioning Lenin’s ‘declaration of war’, Stalin replied: ‘In my opinion we have to be ﬁrm against Lenin.’ A few days earlier, he had already attacked Lenin’s ‘national-liberalism’. 
Lenin’s counter-attack, in October 1922, was vigorous, and Stalin unwillingly had to bow to the leader’s views on the constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. There remained the question of the Georgians and their resistance to the plan for a Transcaucasian Federation, through which, and not directly, the Georgian Soviet Republic would enter the U.S.S.R., according to this plan. Stalin’s pressure on the Georgians to submit became harsher, and Ordzhonikidze, his representative in Tbilisi, even resorted to physical violence against a member of the Georgian Central Committee. The latter then resigned in a body.
The affair became so embittered that a commission of inquiry was appointed, with Dzerzhinsky as chairman. After visiting Caucasia in December 1922 it acquitted Stalin and Ordzhonikidze of the charges brought against them by the Georgian Communists. Lenin, however, urged his secretaries to compile, on their own, a collection of documents that would enable him to form an objective opinion on the question. Full of distrust of the official ‘channels’, he seems to have entrusted Rykov with a personal mission on his behalf, to go to Georgia and investigate. On December 9th Rykov reported to Lenin, and three days later he saw Dzerzhinsky in person. One of Lenin’s secretaries noted that Lenin told her that what he learned ‘had a very painful effect’ on him.”
It was this distress that produced the note on ‘The Question of Nationalities’, in which Lenin wrote: ‘If matters had come to such n pass that Ordzhonikidze could go to the extreme of applying physical violence we can imagine what a mire we have got ourselves into.‘ And once again Lenin pointed to the man he saw as principally responsible for the situation. ‘I think Stalin’s haste and his infatuation with pure administration, together with his spite against the notorious “nationalist-socialism”, played a fatal role here?  Lenin went on to attack ‘that really Russian man, the Great-Russian chauvinist, in substance a rascal and a tyrant, such as the typical Russian bureaucrat is’, and ‘that tide of chauvinistic Great-Russian riff-raff’.  Next day, dictating a further note on the same problem, Lenin saw ﬁt to reafﬁrm the principles that had always guided his policy on the national question.
Refusing to be content with ‘an abstract presentation of the question of nationalism in general’, he insisted that ‘a distinction must necessarily be made between the nationalism of an oppressor nation and that of an oppressed nation, the nationalism of a big nation and that of a small nation’. And he declared that, ‘in respect of the second kind of nationalism, we, nationals of a big nation, have nearly always been guilty, in historic practice, of an inﬁnite number of cases of violence; furthermore, we commit violence and insult an inﬁnite number of times without noticing it.’ Lenin concluded that ‘internationalism on the part of oppressors or “great” nations, as they are called (though they are great only in their violence, only great as bullies), must consist not only in the observance of the formal equality of nations but even in an inequality of the oppressor nation, the great nation, that must make up for the inequality which obtains in actual practice.’ As regards relations with Georgia and with the national minorities as a whole, he advised: ‘it is better to overdo rather than underdo the concessions and leniency toward the national minorities? 
In a ﬁnal note, dated December 31st, like the previous one, Lenin called for punishment of the Soviet leaders guilty of indulging in a chauvinist and oppressive policy towards the Georgians. Although ‘exemplary punishment must be inﬂicted on Comrade Ordzhonikidze’, he considered that ‘the political responsibility for all this truly Great Russian nationalist campaign must, of course, be laid on Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. 
Lenin’s severity in relation to Stalin was perhaps not due merely to the role the latter had played in the Georgian affair. An incident in which the General Secretary clashed with Krupskaya strengthened still further the growing animosity felt by Lenin towards his successor to-be. Having learned on December 22nd that Lenin’s wife had agreed to take down a short letter at the sick man’s dictation, Stalin subjected her, as she put it, to ‘offensive language and threats’.  Stalin’s anger was not without some basis: the letter he was blaming Krupskaya for having taken down was the one in which Lenin proposed to Trotsky that they continue the campaign they had begun together. 
This incident was bound to have a sequel. On March 5th, 1923, two days before the stroke that ﬁnally destroyed Lenin’s physical resistance, he wrote the following letter, which he addressed to Stalin, with a copy to Kamenev and Zinoviev: You have been so rude as to summon my wife to the telephone and use bad language. Although she had told you that she was prepared to forget this, the fact nevertheless became known through her to Zinoviev and Kamenev”
“I have no intention of forgetting so easily what has been done against me, and it goes without saying that what has been done against my wife I consider having been done against me as well. I ask you, therefore, to think it over whether you are prepared to withdraw what you have said and to make your apologies, or whether you prefer that relations between us should be broken off.” 
Stalin’s tirade had been delivered on December 22nd. It is not certain that Lenin knew about it immediately. On December 24th, however, he dictated a note the celebrated ‘Testament’ in which he reviewed the chief personages in the Bolshevik leadership. Regarding Stalin he wrote: ‘Comrade Stalin, having become Secretary-General, has unlimited power concentrated in his hands, and I am not sure whether he will always be capable of using that authority with sufficient caution.’  On January 4th, 1923, he saw ﬁt to dictate a ‘continuation’ to this note, devoted entirely to the subject of Stalin:
“Stalin is too rude, and this defect, although quite tolerable in our midst and in dealings among us Communists, becomes intolerable in a Secretary-General. That is why I suggest that the comrades think about a way of removing Stalin from that post and appointing another man in his stead who in all other respects differs from Comrade Stalin in having only one advantage, namely, that of being more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more considerate to the comrades, less capricious, etc.” 
After the ‘Testament’ had been written, the Georgian affair continued its course. Lenin’s four secretaries formed themselves, at his request, into a ‘clandestine commission’ with the task of completing a dossier that was already overwhelming. On March 3rd the commission presented its conclusions. We do not know what they were. But they evidently seemed to Lenin to justify the haste with which he proceeded to open his last campaign. On March 5th and 6th he dictated three letters, one after the other, which he told his doctors were just ‘business letters’, but which were in fact of major importance. In the ﬁrst of them he appealed to Trotsky to ‘undertake the defence of the Georgian case in the Party C.C.’, adding: ‘I would feel at ease if you agreed to undertake its defence.’  On the same day he sent Stalin the letter (already quoted) in which he threatened to break off relations with him.  On March 6th he sent a ‘top secret’ note to the Georgian Communist leaders. This was the ﬁrst such note, and also the last. ‘I am following your case with all my heart,’ wrote Lenin. ‘I am indignant over Ordzhonikidze’s rudeness and the connivance of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. I am preparing for you notes and a speech.’ 
As Moshe Lewin remarks, these last two days March 5th and 6th, 1923 of Lenin’s active life bore ‘the character of a major struggle. But Lenin’s declining health did not allow him to live much longer in such a state of emotional and nervous tension. His illness grew rapidly more serious.  On March 6th, Krupskaya told Kamenev that Lenin had resolved ‘to crush Stalin politically?  The next day, March 7th, a new attack of arteriosclerosis put an end to Lenin’s active life. His political death saved Stalin‘s career, and meant the doom of Leninism.
Lenin’s greatness lies not so much in his victories as in the way that his life ended, in almost desperate struggle. It is the fight that he put up under the conditions of his ﬁnal illness that proves how genuine was his concern for democracy. Helpless in face of a Stalin with ‘unlimited power concentrated in his hands’, Lenin struck out at his eternal enemy, nationalistic and bureaucratic tyranny. That his own policy had sometimes helped to strengthen that enemy cannot he denied. But the fact remains: for Lenin, that ‘mire’ into which Soviet Russia, isolated and exhausted, proletarian in some ways but still bourgeois in others, had sunk, had to be cleared away, and its effects combated.
He realized that this was an enterprise full of risks. To be sure, he still believed, at the end of his life, in the inevitability of the crisis that would bring capitalism down. But, in his last article, ‘Better Fewer, But Better’, dictated on March 2nd, 1923, he raised once again, without answering it, that question which had haunted him since 1918, and determined his strategy: ‘Shall we be able to hold on with our small and-very-small-peasant-production, and in our present state of ruin, until the West-European capitalist countries consummate their development towards socialism?’ 
There is no trace in these last words of any ‘triumphalist’ cocksureness. But where some would see only an admission of defeat and confession of weakness, there we ﬁnd also the reply of Lenin and Leninism to their detractors. In the anguish and despair of these last struggles, in the doubt and uncertainty of these last questionings, Leninism reveals its true nature, thereby confounding the legion of those who scorn it. The heroic course of ‘Lenin’s last struggle’ does not disarm criticism of his work: but it does make plain the meaning of Leninism as a conception and outlook that are thoroughly democratic in character.
Neither Lenin nor Trotsky agreed with the brutal manner in which Stalin dealt with Georgia.
 This is what makes Moshe Lewin’s book, Le Dernier Combat de Lénine (Paris, 1967 English translation, Lenin’s Last Struggle, London, 1969) so very valuable.
 Lewin, pp. 70, 153 (quoting the 5th edition of Lenin’s collected works,
 In Russian, Vol. XLV, p. 710).
 Ibid., p. 70.
 Ibid., pp. 74, 153 (quoting the same instruction as in n. 1).
 Lenin, Vol. 42, pp. 492-3
 See p. 422.
 Ibid., Vol. 42, p. 484.
 Ibid., Vol. 42, p. 485.
 Ibid., Vol. 42, p. 484.
 Lewin, p. 94 (quoting L. A. Fotieva,one of Lenin’s secretaries, Iz Vaspomimzniy).
 Trotsky, Stalin School of Falsiﬁcation, p. 72
 Lenin, Vol. 33, p. 458.
 Lewin, p. 37 (quoting the 5th edition of Lenin‘: works, in Russian, Vol. XLV, p. 548, n. 126).
 Lenin, op. cit., Vol. 45, p. 604.
 Ibid., Vol. 45, p. 606.
 Ibid., Vol. 33, p. 490.
 Ibid., Vol. 33, p. 482.
 In his letter to Trotsky dated March 5th, 1923, one of the last to be dictated by Lenin, he ends with a subscription that was unusually cordial for him: ‘with best comradely greetings’ (Lenin, Vol. 45. p. 607).
 Ibid., Vol. 33, pp. 482-3, 491; Vol. 36, pp. 603-4.
 Trotsky, My Life, pp. 478-9). Lenin, Vol. 36, pp. 598-602.
 Ibid., Vol. 45, p. 593.
 Ibid., Vol. 36, p. 594.
 Ibid., Vol. 36, p. 605.
 See page 276: Lenin showed a similar attitude in connexion with the prober of relations between Soviet Russia and independent Georgia. Despite well founded grievances against the Menshevik regime in that country, the Soviet Government recognized Georgian independence in May 1920. In February 1921, however, the Red Anny occupied the country and put an end to this independence. The invasion of Georgia was decided on behind the backs of Lenin, Trotsky and the Political Bureau. Shortly before the invasion began Lenin had expressed his opposition to any such move. It was Stain who overruled him. 274 Once the occupation of Georgia was a fait accompli, Lenin sought to mitigate the consequences of a policy that he regarded as harmful. Writing to Ordzhonikidze, who was in charge of ‘Soviet Georgia’, he said: ‘It is of tremendous importance to devise an acceptable compromise for a bloc with Jordania [the former president of the Georgia: Republic, M.L.] or similar Georgian Mensheviks, who before the uprising had not been absolutely opposed to the idea of Soviet power in Georgia on certain terms.275 In a telegram to the Soviet army of occupation he called on them to ‘observe particular respect for the sovereign bodies of Georgia’ and ‘display particular attention and caution in regard to the Georgian population? 276
274: Carr, Vol. II pp 207, 260, 263
275 Dewer p.31.
276 Lenin Vol. 27 pp 249, 259, 316
 Ibid. Vol. 42, p. 421.
 Ibid. Vol. 42, p. 421.
 Ibid., V01. 33, p. 372.
 Pospelov, p. 525.
 Trotsky, Stalin School of Falsiﬁcation, p. 67.
 Lewin, pp. 58, 68 (quoting Fotieva, Iz Vospominaniy), and Lenin, Vol.42, p. 484.
 Lenin, Vol. 36, pp. 605-6.
 Ibid. Vol. 36, p. 606.
 Ibid., Vol. 36, pp. 607-9.
 Ibid., Ibid., Vol. 36, p. 610.
 Ibid., Vol. 45, p. 758.
 See pp. 419-20.
 Ibid., Vol. 45, pp. 607—8.
 Ibid., Vol. 36, pp. 594—5.
 Ibid., Vol. 36, p. 596.
 Ibid., V01. 45, p. 607.
 See p. 423.
 Ibid., V01. 45, pp. 607-8.
 Lewin, p. 98
 Deutscher, Prophet Unarmed, p. 90.
 Lenin, Vol. 33, p. 499.